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SIMPLICITY MADE PLAINER: 
A REPLY TO ROSS 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
The authors try to show that many of the differences between Ross and themselves are 
only apparent, masking considerable agreement. Among the real disagreements, at least 
one is over the interpretation of Aquinas's account of divine simplicity, but the most 
central disagreement consists in the authors' claim that their concern was not with a 
distinction between the way God is and the way he might have been (as Ross suggests) 
but with the difference between the way God is necessarily and the way he is contingently. 
Finally, the authors argue that the concept of simplicity is indeed required for the solution 
of the problems discussed at the end of their original article. 
Apparent opposition and underlying agreement characterize almost all of Pro-
fessor Ross's comments on our "Absolute Simplicity" (Faith and Philosophy 2 
[1985], pp. 353-382 and 383-391). Much of what he wants us to have said we 
do say, only not just as he wants us to have said it. 
In the Introduction to his comments Ross offers a general criticism which 
informs several of his particular objections: He thinks our position unnecessarily 
we.lkens Aquinas's account of divine simplicity. But this is a misunderstanding. 
Ross has taken a wrong impression from our observation "In a sense, then, we 
are weakening the claims basic to the doctrine of simplicity" (p. 369). Those 
claims, which we derive from Aquinas, contain modal terms to which most 
philosophers will give too strong an interpretation. We weaken the claims only 
in the sense that we try to bring the currently standard interpretation of those 
terms into line with what we take to be Aquinas's understanding of them. 
Ross's first particular objection concerns our use of the sense-reference distinc-
tion in introducing the concept of absolute simplicity. He thinks we are mistaken 
in claiming that "perfect knowledge" and "perfect power" are identical in refer-
ence but different in sense; we ought to have said that "they differ in reference, 
too, but not in referent" (Ross, p. 383). They differ in reference, as he puts it, 
because the one expression is used to refer to God's knowledge, while the other 
is u:;ed to refer to God's power; but their single referent is God. Nothing but 
terminology divides him from us on this issue. We speak of "non-synonymous 
expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the same thing" 
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(pp. 356-357). It is that difference in designation which corresponds to Ross's 
"difference of reference," as he may indeed be acknowledging when he concludes 
this objection by saying "it is, I take it, the 'distinct manifestations' that are 
referred to" (Ross, p. 389). 
Ross's attack on the misapplication of "Leibnizian identity" in discussions of 
divine simplicity, coming in the midst of criticisms of what we say, can easily 
be misread as an attack on our article. It isn't; he ends it by saying "I think we 
agree about that," and we think he's right. But the generalized attack is meant 
to prepare the way for one he does direct against our position as he sees it. The 
precise point of the criticism is hard to make out, but as it develops, we are 
described as proposing an unnecessary "retrenchment," as backing away from 
Aquinas's position. On the contrary, we try to show that what Ross calls our 
retrenchment is Aquinas's position, and that Aquinas is right to hold it. (At this 
point there does seem to be a real division between Ross and us, at least over 
the reading of Aquinas.) Ross's objection here stems from his claim that "The 
authors also accept that God would have been really different, had he done 
something else or nothing at all" (Ross, p. 385). But the position we are here 
said to accept is in fact one that we argue against at length, concluding the 
contrary of this position more than once~.g., "Even if we should go so far as 
to say that with regard to some but not all of its objects God's will itself might 
have been different from what it is, this counterfactual claim shows us again 
only a logical distinction and not a metaphysical difference within the divine 
will itself' (p. 372). 
Ross rejects our attempt to answer the question "why there is no real distinction 
between the divine nature and the logically contingent 'act of creating'" (Ross, 
p. 386). More precisely, he denies that we provide anything that could count as 
a reasoned answer, and he offers what he considers a better answer to the 
question. His answer has four parts. The first, third, and fourth parts seem to 
us to be clearly not relevant to the question why there is no real distinction in 
God if he has both contingent and necessary attributes. The second does seem 
relevant; it reads this way: "God's being as he chooses, from etemity, .. .is not 
a real difference from a determinate 'would otherwise have been'" (Ross, p. 
386). Ross is apparently arguing that God's being F although he might have 
been G doesn't count as a real difference in God just because G isn't determinate. 
But if G isn't determinate, what sense can be made of the claim that God might 
have been G? Second, and more important, even if we were to accept what Ross 
says here, is it really relevant to the question at issue? The distinction we're 
concerned with is not between the way God is and the way he might have been 
but rather within the way he is: between the way he is necessarily and the way 
he is contingently. Ross's better answer addresses the wrong question. 
A consideration of an example Ross uses to elucidate his answer helps to show 
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the answer's inappropriateness. Imagining something---call it NC-that is by 
nalure colored and that must by nature choose what color it is, he says that NC's 
being red isn't really distinct from its being colored. Why not? Apparently, as 
Ross sees it, just because there is a "real sameness of the actual red of a thing 
with the color of the thing" (Ross, p. 386). We certainly wouldn't challenge 
that sameness in general, but the question he and we are addressing arises from 
nOlicing, as regards NC and things like it in relevant respects, that although the 
thing mllst be colored, it needn't be red. Pointing out that as a matter of fact 
NC's being colored just is its being red does nothing to dispel our conviction 
that there is a real difference between NC's being necessarily colored and NC's 
being contingently red. 
A.t least twice during his examination of our analysis and defense of the concept 
of simplicity, Ross complains about our use of modal terms, claiming that we 
don't clearly distinguish their senses (e.g., Ross, pp. 387 and 388). But in our 
article we do examine just such distinctions and explain which sense we are 
relying on (e.g., pp. 360-e61 and 367-369), and when we use modal terms 
without such specified senses, we think the context clearly indicates the intended 
sense. 
The concluding section of Ross's comments addresses our applications of the 
doctrine of simplicity. He begins his criticism of our applications by denying 
that simplicity is needed to resolve the problems of essential goodness and of 
omnipotence and impeccability. We do introduce these problems as "closely 
connected" with our main problem regarding simplicity and free choice, but we 
say only that "the development of the doctrine [of simplicity] and the resolution 
of Its difficulties provide grounds on which to resolve" those closely connected 
problems (p. 375). We do not say that the doctrine of simplicity itself is needed 
to resolve those problems, nor do we ourselves include a discussion of them 
among our applications of the doctrine. 
But Ross also has criticisms of the two applications we do make in Section 
8. On his view simplicity is irrelevant to the Euthyphro paradox, for which, he 
thinks, all that matters is that God's goodness is essential to him (Ross, p. 389). 
Here he is mistaken, though; for the voluntarist, too, can maintain that God's 
goodness is essential, if he means by this that whatever God wills is good simply 
in virtue of the fact that God wills it. So adherents of theological objectivism 
(TO) and adherents of theological subjectivism (TS) can agree that God's good-
ness is essential to him. Furthermore, Aquinas's view (cited approvingly by 
Ross) that "the divine nature, the very being of God. is the standard of moral 
law" (Ross, p. 389) entails but is not entailed by the claim that God's goodness 
is essential to him; and so the two are not interchangeable, as he suggests. An 
adherent of (TO) who maintains merely that God's goodness is essential would 
not thereby be provided with a basis on which to deny that God's goodness 
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confom1s to an ultimate standard extrinsic to himself. To maintain Aquinas's 
view, then, as we argued in our article, requires the doctrine of simplicity, 
according to which God's willing is identical with his nature. 
In our concluding application of the doctrine of simplicity to Rowe's discussion 
of the cosmological argument we say that "it is possible for a logically necessary, 
omnipotent being to will that certain entities or events be contingent" (p. 377). 
In commenting on this passage Ross says (1) that we're equivocating on the 
modalities, (2) that Rowe is (but we aren't) talking about an explanation which 
necessitates the explanandum, and (3) that in any case simplicity, again, has 
nothing to do with it (Ross, pp. 389-390). We disagree with him on all three 
counts. (1) In our claim the modalities are explicitly logical. (2) Rowe maintains 
that there cannot be a contingent fact C which is explained by a necessary fact 
N. Let C be the fact that there is a contingent entity, where by "contingent" we 
mean logically contingent. Then C is explained-necessitated, in Rowe's sense 
of "explained"-by a logically necessary fact, the fact that God exists. (3) As 
for the involvement of simplicity, perhaps it can be seen more clearly by beginning 
with an ordinary, unreflective distinction between God's existing and God's 
willing. On that basis C is not explained by a necessary fact but only by a 
combination of a necessary fact (that God exists) and a contingent fact (that God 
wills C). But once simplicity has been introduced, God's willing cannot be really 
distinguished from his being, which is necessary. It is in that way that the doctrine 
of simplicity is crucial to our claim that C-a logically contingent fact-is 
explained by a logically necessary fact. 
We're grateful for Professor Ross's comments. In our reply we've tried to 
show that many of the differences between him and us are only apparent, and 
we hope to have helped our underlying agreement to emerge more clearly. 
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